

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINETY-FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Wednesday, 12 December 1962 at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. J.E.G. HARDY

(Canada)

63-02949

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO
Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. V. ISMIRLIEV

Burma:

U TUN SHEIN
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB
Mr. J.F.M. BELL
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. J. BUCEK
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU
ATO H. HAMID
ATO M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. E. STANLEWSKI
Mr. W. WIECZOREK
Mr. R. KRZYZANOWSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. M. STAHL
Mr. P. KELLIN
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT
Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER

Sir Michael WRIGHT

Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I declare open the ninety-first plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before I call on the first speaker, I should like to bring to the attention of members of delegations a matter of procedure concerning the time of release of the documents and records of our Conference. I have been informed by the co-Chairmen that, in order to make the records of the Conference more quickly available to States Members of the United Nations and to the public, they recommend that in future the documents and the verbatim records should be released as soon as they are prepared in final form.

If this recommendation is approved by the Conference, it will mean that in practice only the provisional verbatim records will carry the symbol "Private" and will not be released; that documents, unless otherwise stated, will be released immediately; and that the final verbatim record will be available about three weeks after a meeting takes place instead of after the present delay of about five weeks.

Does any delegation wish to comment on this proposal?

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I only wish to intervene for one moment to say that I welcome the proposal. In my country -- as, I am sure, in the countries of other delegations here -- there has been keen interest taken in our proceedings, and from time to time there have been regrets expressed at the delay in making these documents available. I very much welcome this effort to make them available more quickly, and anything that can be done to speed up their release is something that I should like to welcome on behalf of my delegation.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): Is there any other comment on the proposal? If not, I shall consider that it is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I call now upon the first speaker for today, the representative of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): We are glad that the Committee has again begun to consider specific problems of general and complete disarmament. The subject we are discussing today - the question of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles - has an extremely important place within the whole problem of general and complete disarmament. During the second part of the

(Mr. Kirka, Czechoslovakia)

negotiations in particular, the Committee devoted a great deal of attention to the problems of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles simultaneously with the elimination of bases on foreign soil and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of other States. That is quite understandable, because this problem is directly related to removal of the threat of nuclear war, which, because of the growing destructive power of nuclear weapons, is the greatest threat facing mankind.

We have said already on past occasions that this aim - the removal of the threat of nuclear war - can be achieved only by taking successive radical measures during the very first stage of disarmament. Partial solutions or half-measures, such as the so-called percentage reduction upon which the western representatives again insisted at our last meeting, not only would not preclude the outbreak of nuclear war, but on the contrary would create new and serious problems and difficulties.

Perhaps it would be appropriate to support our point of view by quoting the words of the well-known British scientist and writer Professor P.M.S. Blackett, who wrote at the beginning of this year, when our Committee was starting its work:

"The number of nuclear weapons, their explosive power and the diversity of the delivery systems on both sides, are so large that no small step of nuclear disarmament can have much decisive military significance ..." ("Studies of War", by P.M.S. Elackett, p.164)

The recent international crisis in the Caribbean has shown once more the urgent need to concentrate our efforts within the framework of all the problems of general and complete disarmament and particularly upon the elimination of the essential means of waging a nuclear war.

Of course, since the western Powers still oppose the elimination of nuclear weapons during the first stage of general and complete disarmament, it is essential to seek another reliable path towards the removal of the threat of nuclear war and of surprise attack at the very beginning of the disarmament process. The elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles simultaneously with the elimination of military bases on foreign soil and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of other States, as the Soviet Government has proposed in part II of its draft treaty (ENDC/2*, pp.5-9), constitutes such a path. Unfortunately, however, it has so far been impossible to achieve any progress towards the solution of this problem because of the western Powers' opposition.

(Mr. Kirša, Czechoslovakia)

In the past, our representative in this Committee has several times discussed the objections which the western Powers have raised against the measures proposed by the Soviet Union and has shown them to be unfounded. Their baselessness was once more demonstrated most convincingly in his statement at our last meeting by Mr. Tsarapkin, the representative of the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.90, pp. 19 et seq.), and therefore I do not consider it necessary for me to return to them.

I wish only to emphasize that the resistance of the western delegations to the proposed measures has caused serious difficulties in our work. We therefore welcomed the move of the Soviet Union when, guided by its desire to find a common basis for agreement, it submitted to the seventeenth session of the General Assembly a new proposal for solving the problem of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles (A/PV.1127 (provisional), p.38). The essence of this proposal, as has already been pointed out, is that during the first stage, while measures for general and complete disarmament are in progress, the Soviet Union and the United States should retain a limited and precisely-determined quantity of missiles. This would comprise an agreed number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles in the ground-to-air category, which would be located exclusively upon their owner's territory and be destroyed only after the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the second stage of general and complete disarmament.

We value this Soviet proposal as a new indication of a sincere desire to reach a mutually acceptable solution, and we expressed our complete support for it in the general debate at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. (A/PV.1129 (provisional), p.62).

Now I should like to make a few remarks on the subject of this proposal. First of all, it should be emphasized that we do not understand it as an acceptance of the principle of percentage reductions in nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. I refer to the principle of percentage reductions set forth in the United States draft treaty (ENDC/30, p.4) and again insisted upon by the representatives of the western Powers at our last meeting.

To our mind it would be a mistake to see in this proposal a departure from what we still consider the most important measure in the whole process of general and complete disarmament. That fundamental and initial measure must be the elimination of the basic materials which make a nuclear conflict possible. Recent events have shown this danger to exist in every serious international crisis.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

This danger can be removed if nuclear weapon delivery vehicles are eliminated at the outset. Thus the United States proposal, which would retain during the first stage 70 per cent of the delivery vehicles together with the untouched stocks of nuclear weapons, does not solve the problem at all. If it were implemented, the whole world would remain on the brink of a nuclear conflict. What is more, the retention of foreign bases and of armed forces on foreign soil which it provides for would in fact give a one-sided military advantage to the western Powers and their military groupings.

The Soviet proposal, in our opinion, reflects the urgent necessity of speeding up the achievement of agreement on this most serious problem of the first stage, upon the solution of which depends agreement on many if not all of the other problems of general and complete disarmament. It is essential also to appreciate that the proposal meets the main objections raised by the western Powers during the discussion of item 5 b (ENDC/1/Add.3) to the total elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery systems during the first stage. The representatives of the western Powers, as we all know, have again put forward demands that they should be permitted to retain those systems which they call their nuclear "protective umbrella" (ENDC/PV.90, p.44) and which are intended to serve as a means of defence in the hypothetical event of a State declining to implement the agreement and concealing a number of strategic missiles. We still hold that this objection also is without foundation. The point is that, even if we suppose that a quantity of such weapons were concealed, this would not confer upon an aggressor any decisive advantage.

We consider that the new Soviet proposal is a step towards the removal of these fears amongst the western States. If indeed such fears really existed, the possibility that both sides might retain a small and strictly limited quantity of the missiles we have mentioned until the end of the second stage of general and complete disarmament should, in our opinion, completely dispel them.

I should like to emphasize that the Soviet proposal provides first and foremost for the retention of a strictly limited quantity of prescribed types of missiles the main purpose of which would be exclusively defensive. That strictly limited quantity of missiles would certainly not permit a surprise nuclear attack of such a kind as would influence the outcome of an armed conflict. It would be of even less use to an aggressor hoping to win an aggressive war by their use.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

In connexion with the ideas contained in the Soviet proposal, it is of value to draw attention to the opinions expressed at the beginning of this year by certain western specialists. I refer again, for example, to the views of Professor P.M.S. Blackett, who has expressed in certain parts of his book "Studies of War" basically the same idea that underlies the new Soviet proposal. He writes:

"The simplest big first step, and the one most consistent with realistic military considerations, is that the two giant powers should reduce their nuclear forces to a very low and purely deterrent role ..."

The numbers, he declared should be minimal. We cannot see how even the western Powers can object to this approach to one of the chief measures in the first stage, the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

As has been emphasized already, the Soviet proposal provides for the retention of those delivery vehicles in strictly limited quantities exclusively on the territory of the United States and of the Soviet Union; that is to say that foreign military bases should be eliminated simultaneously. In this connexion, it must be pointed out that the western Powers, while emphasizing the need to maintain equilibrium of armaments during the disarmament process, nevertheless refuse to agree to the simultaneous elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and of all military bases on foreign territory. Incidentally, insistent demands for the speedy elimination of military bases on foreign soil were also made in the debates at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, since these bases are a source of international tension. The presence of these military bases with which the NATO countries have surrounded the socialist States can be explained only by a desire to maintain a springboard for aggression as near as possible to those States' frontiers. Moreover, the siting of these bases in operational areas and their equipment leave no possible doubt of their purpose, which is not defensive action at all, but support and expansion of co-ordinated attacks.

The elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign soil are thus inseparable parts and conditions of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

It would be contrary to elementary logic if, when the most modern missile systems which constitute the socialist countries' most effective and fundamental defence had been eliminated, these bases remained to threaten their security.

It is our basic conviction that the Soviet proposal would completely satisfy the defence and security requirements of both sides. One can only hope that the western Powers will show the same understanding of the need to eliminate military bases in order to guarantee the security of the other side as the Soviet Union has shown on priorities in the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

In our view the new Soviet move concerning the highly important first stage could open wide opportunities for further negotiations aimed at agreement on this serious question. Its essence is clear. Surely it is utterly practical, even in regard to the categories of armament to be retained by both sides. Since the aim and the essence of this idea are both clear, it remains only for the western Powers to study the proposal and adopt a clear attitude towards it.

The representatives of the western Powers have repeatedly assured us that they really do wish to make decisive progress in the disarmament negotiations, especially towards removing the threat of nuclear war.

The new Soviet proposal paves the way towards this very goal, and our western colleagues would do well to use it to the full.

Unfortunately the reactions of the western delegations to the Soviet Union's new move have not so far been very encouraging. Instead of taking up a clear-cut position, the western Powers' representatives have from the start been trying to side-track the negotiations. They have raised a number of chiefly technical questions that ought to be left for later negotiations, which cannot in our view be held until agreement on principles has been reached.

We are concerned also about another serious circumstance. We find ourselves wondering how sincere our western colleagues are when they ask again and again for further clarification of the Soviet proposal, and what these appeals are worth if at the same time they preclude negotiation of an agreement.

The delegations of the socialist countries, including Czechoslovakia, have emphasized more than once in the past that the principle of equal security during general and complete disarmament demands that the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be inseparably linked with the elimination of foreign bases and with the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territories of other States. Nevertheless, the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, stated at our last meeting:

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

"...the elimination of so-called foreign bases proposed by the Soviet Union for the first stage would create grave imbalance and jeopardize most seriously the security of the United States and its allies, and is therefore unacceptable" (ENDC/PV.90, p. 33)

This is a peculiar approach to negotiations, Mr. Chairman, when one side wishes to retain the military bases with which it has surrounded the other side's territory and at the same time expects the other side to give up its essential means of defence. In other words, this is an open attempt to gain a military advantage for one side. This position of the western delegations blocks the way to agreement which had been opened by the new Soviet proposal providing for the security of both sides. We can only hope that this time commonsense will triumph and the western Powers' representatives will review their position, adopt a realistic attitude to the new Soviet proposal, and join us in attempting to reach an agreement based on it.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I should like to make a very brief statement today in connexion with a working paper on measures to reduce the risk of war, which the United States delegation is asking the Secretariat to circulate as a Conference document (ENDC/70). As I noted on 26 November, at the opening meeting of this resumed session (ENDC/PV.83, pp.27 and 28-30), the question of measures to reduce the risk of war is an important one and offers opportunities for early agreement that should not be passed by. I pointed out at that time that it would seem unnecessary to have extensive debate on the desirability of such measures and that we should rather focus attention on discussion of the means and manner of implementing such measures. The focus of attention at this resumed session of the Conference has been, and rightly so, on the question of concluding a treaty to ban nuclear testing. As a result, there has not been an opportunity for sufficient consideration of measures to reduce the risk of war. However, my delegation has had some discussion of this subject at the co-Chairmen's meetings, and the United States delegation believes that it should inform the Conference of the views of the United States on this question. Therefore it is circulating this working paper as the best means of doing so.

The United States working paper sets forth some general considerations on this problem and then discusses the general characteristics of the measures outlined in section F, pages 11 and 12, of the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World (ENDC/30 and Corr.1).

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The suggestions contained in the working paper reflect the results of careful study of this problem by the United States Government. These suggestions are made with the greatest seriousness, and I hope that the members of this Conference will study our paper most carefully. It seems to us that progress in this area is perhaps most likely to result from rather informal discussion, at least in the first instance, and we should venture to hope that further discussion at co-Chairmen's meetings, as one forum, might prove helpful in this regard. At an appropriate time, the United States believes, it would perhaps be useful to establish an informal technical military working group or groups to discuss the various methods of carrying out the various possible measures. Such working groups could then report to the Conference and to governments, and on the basis of their reports political and legal experts could draft the documents embodying the precise agreements to be ratified by our respective governments. At the present moment, however, it would seem that the most fruitful course of action would be continuation of informal discussion by the two co-Chairmen. For that reason, I should point out that my delegation is circulating the working paper not for the purpose of stimulating discussion in the plenary session before the Christmas recess, but rather so that the working paper can be available to members of the Conference for their study. Perhaps we could decide how we want to take up this matter when we come back in January.

I should like to comment very briefly on the remarks of the representative of Czechoslovakia, which I should like to study and comment on in more detail at a later date. If I understood him correctly, he said that the United States delegation sought to shut off debate (supra, p.10) on the very interesting proposal that Mr. Gromyko of the Soviet Union made to the United Nations on 21 September 1962. That is the last thing in the world that we want to do. We should like to get a good deal more facts about that very interesting proposal. Without going in extenso into that subject, I would say that the proposition that one should first agree on the principles before one knows the facts is somewhat like what the Red Queen said in "Alice in Wonderland": "First the verdict, and then the evidence" -- because the evidence confused her.

With regard to the subject of foreign bases, Sir Patrick Dean of the United Kingdom the other day gave a most interesting discussion of how Russia was built up and of the various territories that it had acquired over the years. Sometimes this question of foreign bases reminds me of the mediaeval dukes who took all the best land

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and then objected when the peasants tried to exchange small holdings with one another because some of them had the sun in the morning or the sun in the afternoon. The dukes are said to have replied that they did not want to be monopolists, that all they wanted to do was to own the land next to their own. If one looks at a map of the Soviet Union, it would seem that that is precisely the theory on which the Soviet Union has built its empire: all it wanted to do was to own the land next to its own. The United States, on the other hand, as is well known, has set nations free. Therefore, before we put labels on these matters and say that a certain country has bases in a third of the world's area or has a relatively small area of the world and has other countries as allies, we are again going to have to sit down and look at the map of the globe and look at the evidence. In our desire to look at the evidence, we do not under any circumstances wish to foreclose the discussion.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): Before beginning my statement, which refers to problems of the contents of the first stage of general and complete disarmament, please allow me to say a few words about the new initiative of the Soviet Government brought to our knowledge by the representative of the Soviet Union in this Committee, Mr. Tsarapkin, at our meeting of 10 December (ENDC/PV.90, pp.14 et seq.). I refer to the proposal to use automatic seismic stations which, in addition to the national means of detection, permit of the solution of the problem of control over underground nuclear tests.

As there are still significant differences between the two parties, the attempt to find a mutually acceptable solution must be greatly appreciated. The proposal of the Soviet Union to use automatic unmanned seismic stations and the statement made by the Soviet Union that it is ready to accept two or three stations of this kind on its territory (ibid.), involving a certain element of international control, bring to our negotiations a new and significant element meant to facilitate the speedy achievement of an agreement. We have before us a proposal offering the possibility of a compromise acceptable by both parties. We consider that a treaty can be concluded on this basis banning all nuclear weapon tests. It is a proposal to which the greatest importance must be attached in the negotiations at our Conference. As far as we are concerned, we support it fully.

It is our conviction that new prospects for an agreement are opening up, that the possibility is in sight that by the end of this year we may report to the General Assembly, to the peoples all over the world, that an important success has been achieved -- the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, their cessation for ever.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

I now come back to the issue which is the subject of our discussion today. We are again tackling a problem of outstanding importance for general and complete disarmament and, consequently, for the completion of our paramount task -- that of working out the treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. We are to determine, within the framework of measures to be taken in the first stage, the obligations incumbent upon States with regard to the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles.

As is known, the socialist delegations are proceeding in this matter from the point of view of the urgent necessity of removing, in the first stage, the danger of a nuclear war.

It is hard to conceive that general and complete disarmament -- a process which, however speedily we might implement it, will still take several years to complete -- would be successfully carried out if the peril of a nuclear war were still hovering over mankind. On the contrary, the removal of that peril would be apt to bring about a brightening of international relations in which general and complete disarmament could be brought to completion.

Starting from this requisite, the socialist countries have proposed from the very beginning the elimination, during the first stage, of all nuclear weapons. That is the safest way of doing away with any possibility of nuclear conflagration.

As the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, emphasized at our meeting on 10 December (ibid, p.16.), the Soviet Government is still ready to adopt such a measure now if the western Powers agree to it.

But the western governments have opposed this proposal. Neither do they agree to it today. This is proved by, inter alia, the debates taking place in this Committee.

In an effort to meet the positions of the western Powers, and taking into account that nuclear weapons deprived of their means of delivery cannot be used, the Soviet Union has proposed to proceed to the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage of the process of general and complete disarmament. This is precisely what was provided in the Soviet draft treaty for general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2) submitted to our Committee on 15 March 1962.

The western Powers, however, argue against this proposal too. "If the means of delivery to the targets of nuclear weapons were taken away from us in the first stage of disarmament" -- so the western delegations submit -- "we should be affected unfavourably from a military point of view, as the Soviet Union would possess a

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certain superiority in so far as the so-called conventional armaments are concerned". Of course, the representatives of the western Powers have put forward other arguments as well, but this is the essential one.

It has become abundantly clear during our debates that this argument is groundless. The Romanian delegation has taken part in the discussion and has tried to demonstrate to the western Powers the flimsiness of their arguments. We are not going to resume that peaceful struggle -- I stress "peaceful" -- but we beg to reserve to ourselves the right to return to this at an appropriate time.

In its concern to find a solution which would take into account the positions of all parties and thus open the way for reaching agreement, the Soviet Government has introduced a certain modification of its initial proposals (ENDC/2/Rev.1). The essence of that modification consists in admitting an exception from the principle of eliminating all nuclear weapon vehicles during the first stage.

As I had the opportunity of declaring at our meeting on 28 November (ENDC/PV.84, p.7), it is our conviction that the best solution would be to eliminate during the first stage all nuclear delivery vehicles without any exception. However, we are supporting the new Soviet proposal. We hold that it allows the establishment of an agreement in this matter, which is -- I repeat -- essential for the success of general and complete disarmament.

The merit of this proposal is that it opens the prospect of overcoming the deadlock. It is a solution which maintains the principle of removing the danger of a nuclear war in the first stage, at the same time taking into account the western Powers' claim to retain over a certain period a "nuclear umbrella", which they represent to be necessary for their security.

In fact, in articles 5 to 8 of Document ENDC/2/Rev.1 we read provisions aimed at eliminating missiles, aircraft, surface vessels and artillery capable of delivering nuclear warheads to the target, at liquidating all submarines as well as the ancillary equipment. At the same time, there is provision for the cessation of the manufacture of such means, for the dismantling, the destruction or conversion to exclusively peaceful use of the respective enterprises and workshops.

The new Soviet proposal, which was brought to the notice of the United Nations General Assembly by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko (A/PV.1127(provisional), p.38), provides, as an exception to the rule, that the

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Soviet Union and the United States should maintain on their territories during an established period of time a limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles of the ground-to-air type. We beg to emphasize that this new proposal is an exception to the general rule and we must regard it as such.

This proposal meets the claims of the western Powers half-way, and if we did not bring its political aspect into relief we should not fully understand its nature, which is propitious for our negotiations. It proves once more the desire of the Soviet Union to achieve general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

In our opinion the achievement of an agreement on the basis of the new Soviet proposal would give an impetus to our negotiations, opening up, as it does, broad possibilities for the reaching of our goal: to work out a treaty for general and complete disarmament.

We are all agreed that the first stage must constitute the most significant moment in the context of the general and complete disarmament process. It is also largely recognized that the core of the first stage must consist of the measures meant to bring about the removal of the danger of nuclear war. Obviously an agreement on these measures would considerably facilitate our reaching mutually acceptable solutions for the fulfilment of the other tasks relative to the first stage.

The content of the first stage -- the concrete obligations which fall upon States in this stage -- once established, would make it comparatively easy to come to agreement on the measures which are to be implemented during stages II and III of the general and complete disarmament process.

I should like it correctly understood that, in insisting on the need to take strict steps with a view to eliminating the danger of a nuclear conflict already in the first stage, we do not at all minimize the significance of measures aiming at a substantial reduction of the armed forces and the conventional armaments of States. The Soviet draft treaty contains provisions which, once put into effect, would tend to reduce to a great extent, and from the very beginning, the danger of a war waged with such means.

It is common knowledge in this Committee that in that field too the Soviet proposals are more comprehensive than those of the United States (ENDC/30 and Corr.1).

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Allow me to refer now to the position taken by the western Powers with regard to the new Soviet offer. Of course, one cannot say that the representatives of those Powers kept silent over the proposal made by the Soviet Union: rather the reverse. We have all listened to statements which showed a certain interest on their part. In the statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, at the meeting of 10 December, certain indications in this respect are to be found (ENDC/PV.90, pp. 27 et seq.). Today Mr. Dean said that Mr. Gromyko's proposal is very interesting. In his turn, the United Kingdom representative, Sir Michael Wright, told us at our meeting on 10 December that:

"Consideration of the new Soviet proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1), offers an excellent opportunity for real discussion..." (ENDC/PV.90, p.41)

The representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, welcomed the new Soviet proposal at our meeting on 30 November (ENDC/PV.85, p.13).

Some of those statements contained certain elements which are not likely to be of good omen. I am referring to an entire series of questions on the details of the issue requesting many explanations, clarifications and explorations. May I stress once again, as I did some days ago, that we, for our part, do not exclude the possibility, and even the necessity, of clarifying the details in due course. After all, we have never heard anybody stand up against the clarification of problems concerning the details of the implementation of an agreement. However, would it not be quite natural that, while such questions are asked, a clear answer should be given to the very substance of the new and important Soviet proposal? And would it not be quite natural that some, if not almost all such clarifications should be given in the course of concrete negotiations on the basis of this proposal? In our view such an approach is a natural one, and consequently conducive to tangible results. And let us tackle this issue not during the official and unofficial meetings of our Conference alone, but during the meetings of our co-Chairmen also. What is essential is to reach agreement on this matter of paramount importance as speedily as possible. I am convinced that if the two co-Chairmen were to reach agreement on this issue in the coming days all members of this Committee would gladly welcome it.

One would think that the questions asking for explanation and clarification of certain aspects of the new Soviet offer would follow the line of effort directed to achieving an agreement. However, I must confess that the statements

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of the representatives of the United States and United Kingdom at our meeting on 10 December were not of a nature to justify such an interpretation. A study of the statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, at that meeting shows that the United States delegation holds to its old positions, which are known to this Conference and which were not and are not able to promote negotiations. Indeed, after a series of questions by which Mr. Stelle, to use his own words, aimed at indicating

" ... in a broad and preliminary way some of the general areas in which clarifications of the Soviet proposal would be most useful in assisting our consideration of the proposal" (ENDC/PV.90, p. 30),

he brought forward arguments in the same statement, which prove that no change has taken place and none is envisaged in the old position of the United States.

Further, the United States representative voiced his delegation's hope that

" ... in the process of clarifying and elaborating its new proposal, the Soviet delegation will be able to indicate that the Soviet Union is now willing to abandon its unrealistic and inequitable concept of carrying out total, or almost total, disarmament in stage I with respect to one particular class of armaments, which cannot even be easily defined, and is prepared to move in the direction of progressive across-the-board reduction of all classes of armaments through the different stages of the disarmament process." (ibid., pp.33-34)

Is this not, then, an indication that the questions raised are of a nature not to illustrate a tendency towards the achievement of an agreement on a new basis, but to lead to the objective conclusion that the United States Government is not desirous of moving from its old positions? That this is so is also proved by the following words of the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle:

"The United States has believed and continues to believe that the method of progressive across-the-board reductions of armaments is the most realistic one, and is sound and feasible." (ibid., p. 34)

This is not, of course, the proper time to embark again upon a minute analysis of the consequences of the adoption of such a position. We have done it on several occasions in this Conference. I should like only to mention that the implementation of such a proposal, far from leading to the elimination of the danger of nuclear war, would only maintain it, not only during the first stage, but in the second and even

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

the third stage too. One single example in this regard ought to be sufficient. Let us take the United States weekly magazine U.S. News and World Report. It could be objected that that magazine does not represent the United States Government. Very well. That is why I will not quote opinions or commentaries from it; but I shall use some data. At least so far as the data relating to the United States are concerned, this magazine has repeatedly proved its reliability. For that reason I shall make use of the data.

On 3 December 1962, the magazine disclosed that the United States possessed at that time 406 long-range ballistic missiles -- that is, missiles of over 2,000 miles' range -- able to deliver to the target 986 megatons, or the equivalent of 986 million tons of TNT. Let us take those figures at their face value and do a little arithmetic. If we were to agree to a 30 per cent cut, as provided for by the United States draft treaty, that would mean that at the end of the first stage the United States would still possess over 270 missiles of this class which could deliver to a target nuclear warheads with a destructive power of about 650 megatons, or the equivalent of 650 million tons of TNT.

To that should certainly be added a rather significant number of long and middle-range bombers, which equally could deliver a considerable amount of nuclear bombs.

Under the provisions of the same proposals, at the end of the second stage the United States Government would still possess 135 long range ballistic missiles able to deliver nuclear warheads amounting to about 330 megatons, or the equivalent of 330 million tons of TNT. That would represent over 160 times as much as the total amount of explosives blasted during the Second World War. I would mention that I have left aside the nuclear bombs which could be delivered to the target by the bombers still at the disposal of the United States Government by the end of the second stage. Hence the utterly unsatisfactory nature of the western proposals, according to which at the end of two disarmament stages one State alone would still have the possibility of plunging the whole of mankind into a disaster comparable to the scourge of 160 wars of the kind of the Second World War.

That is not disarmament. That is not immediate elimination of the greatest peril that has ever hovered above mankind.

Those are the intrinsic weaknesses of the western proposals, and that is why such proposals cannot be accepted. They are not of a nature to remove the danger of a nuclear war and, therefore, they would not lead to the solution of the problems confronting us.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

With permission I shall now bring before the Committee, in a few words, another aspect of the issue. It is unanimously acknowledged -- and this is emphasized by paragraph 5 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) -- that in the course of the disarmament process no State or group of States should obtain military advantages, and that security must be equally ensured for all. Hence the necessity that, simultaneously with the liquidation of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, military bases on foreign territory should also be liquidated and foreign troops stationed on the territories of other States should be withdrawn. This problem is one of outstanding importance for the prospect of the further development of international relations in general and for the implementation of general and complete disarmament in particular. We do not mean to embark now upon the details of the problems connected with the necessity of eliminating in the first stage military bases on foreign territories and the withdrawal of armed forces stationed on such territories. At the same time, we did not deem it possible to analyse, however briefly, the elimination in the first stage of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and, generally speaking, the necessity of eliminating the danger of nuclear war, without stressing its organic link, in the present conditions, with the liquidation of military bases and the withdrawal of armed forces stationed on foreign territory. The Romanian delegation reserves the right to tackle this important problem at the appropriate time.

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I have listened with great interest to the speeches by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, the United States of America and Romania.

My delegation will study with the greatest attention the working paper (ENDC/70) which Mr. Dean has just submitted on one of the most important collateral problems in our programme of work, that of the reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication. I share his desire and hope that we shall reach agreement on this problem before Christmas. If agreement could also be arrived at on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests which has first priority in world public opinion, it would be possible to begin the New Year by marking out fresh paths of international co-operation and understanding.

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

I do not at the moment want to make any remarks on the theme of general and complete disarmament which we are discussing. I have only asked to speak in order to make a brief general statement. On instructions from my government I wish to read a telegram which the Senate of the United States of Mexico has asked me to communicate to this Disarmament Committee. It reads as follows:

"The Senators and Deputies members of the Congress of the United States of Mexico, interpreting the feeling of our people and the action taken by our President Adolfo Lopez Mateos, decided on 15 November 1962 to address an appeal to all national congresses, parliaments, popular assemblies or legislative bodies asking them to call for international peace, world disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear tests for warlike purposes.

The text of the document embodying the national protest against the armaments race will be sent simultaneously through our Government's official channels to your Disarmament Committee and to the national congresses to which it is addressed.

We wish the Conference success in its work, for the eyes of the world are upon it.

Guillermo Ramirez Valadez,
President of the Senate of the Republic"
(ENDC/71).

I shall have the honour to make known to the members of this Committee later the text of the document to which this cable refers.

This action by my country's Congress is an expression and a symbol of the interest and concern of the people and the Government of Mexico for the success of the tasks entrusted to this Conference, on whose efforts depend the discontinuance of nuclear arms tests, the cessation of the arms race and the preservation of peace.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I have noted with the greatest interest the message which Mr. Padilla Nervo has conveyed to us, and I hope that all the members of the Committee will do likewise.

Mr. LALL (India): My delegation also would wish to welcome the statement which we have just heard from Mr. Padilla Nervo in the form of a message from the Congress of Mexico. We think that the action of the Congress of Mexico -- while of course restricted to its own membership and country -- represents very fully the views of the people of the whole world on this matter, namely, that there should be a special effort in this Conference to reach agreement on disarmament.

We understand perfectly the feelings of the representatives in the Congress of Mexico, which must be that it is time that this Conference should start to reach agreement. We have been at this task now for almost nine months. No agreements have been reached. Yesterday, a colleague asked me how we would report to our governments if we wanted to report truthfully on what we had done in nine months. My colleague and I agreed that we could report in one short sentence, which was that we had done nothing -- that is, we had reached no agreement. The point is, how far have we progressed towards agreement? The plain answer is that we have done nothing. That is a heavy responsibility to bear. The armaments situation in the world is more dangerous today than it was in March when we started. When we started in March, leaders of the two sides said that we could not get security through armaments and that we could only get destruction through the armaments race. But what have we done? Nothing, so far.

The delegation of India is grateful for the efforts which have been made by the two sides, for the movements from their original positions which they had enunciated before this Conference, some of which were submitted to the General Assembly a few months ago. But what have they resulted in? Absolutely nothing. That is something which must be remedied and it must be remedied now; therefore, we feel that the action of the Congress of Mexico is one of supreme importance. It is not one for any one of us over here to take in a purely conventional spirit. We trust that it will have its effect and, as Mr. Padilla Nervo started to say, that we can do something before Christmas to reach agreement on some matters, otherwise this Conference will certainly lose a great deal of respect in the eyes of the people of the world.

Ato HAMID (Ethiopia): My delegation also appreciates the move made by the Congress of Mexico, as indicated in the message read to us by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo.

(Ato Hamid, Ethiopia)

When we returned here to resume our negotiations, we did so with the hope that an agreement banning nuclear tests would be achieved. We came here with that hope because, at our last session, the leaders of the three great nuclear Powers indicated that they would be prepared to end testing by the end of this year or by the beginning of next year. That gave hope, not only to us here, but to peoples and governments all over the world. I suppose it is on the basis of that hopeful statement that the General Assembly decided to recommend to this Conference that at least an interim agreement --- if not a permanent treaty --- banning tests in the three environments, accompanied by an agreement on the suspension of underground tests, should be achieved. We came here with that hope, reinforced by General Assembly resolution 1762A (XVII) (ENDC/63). As things stand today, we have really begun to lose that hope, and we wish that the representatives and governments of the great nuclear Powers would take this very seriously and meet the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of the world. I trust that everybody agrees with this sentiment, that the aspirations of the peoples of the world will not be frustrated and that we shall at least have something to show to them at the end of this year.

Mr. IBU (Nigeria): The message just read to us by the leader of the Mexican delegation summarizes the feelings of humanity on this most important issue. We have made our feelings known on innumerable occasions, and the feelings expressed in this Committee are in fact those of our respective Parliaments, which we have the honour to represent. The statement read to us by the representative of Mexico is a sad reminder that this Committee has not achieved any substantial results since we set about our work here some nine months ago. Nothing could gladden more the hearts of many outside this Committee room than if, by the end of next week, there should be a change of heart which would lead us to reach some area of agreement on this most important subject.

I fear that this message, which is so well expressed, is but the kind of message that can be expected from all our Parliaments if nothing is achieved here by the end of this year. I therefore join the representatives who have spoken in recommending to all concerned that we should make the progress which is long overdue.

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico). (translation from Spanish): A few words to express my gratitude to the representatives who have been good enough to refer to the message which I have read on my government's instructions. Their views will be duly communicated to my government and to the National Congress.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): Before reading the communique, I would say that the co-Chairmen recommend that our meeting on Friday should be devoted to a continuation of the discussion of items 5 b and 5 c of our Procedure of Work (ENDC/1/Add.3.) I take it that that is acceptable to the Committee.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its ninety-first plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. J.E.G. Hardy, representative of Canada.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, the United States, Romania, Mexico, Italy, India, Ethiopia and Nigeria.

"The United States delegation tabled a working paper on reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication (ENDC/70).

"The Mexican delegation tabled a message by the President of the Senate of the United States of Mexico on disarmament and the cessation of nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/71).

"The Conference decided that, in order to make the records of the Conference more quickly available to members of the United Nations and the public, in future the documents and the verbatim records will be released as soon as they are prepared in final form.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 14 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.